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Abstract 
Self representation is fundamental to mental functions. While the self has mostly been 
studied in traditional psycho-philosophical terms (‘self as subject’), recent laboratory 
work suggests that the self can be measured quantitatively by assessing biases towards 
self-associated stimuli (‘self as object’). Here we will summarize new quantitative 
paradigms for assessing the self, drawn from psychology, neuroeconomics, embodied 
cognition, and social neuroscience. We then propose a neural model of the self as an 
emerging property of interactions between a core ‘self network’ (e.g. mPFC), a cognitive 
control network (e.g. dlPFC), and a salience network (e.g. insula). This framework not 
only represents a step forward in self research, but also has important clinical 
significance, resonating recent efforts in computational psychiatry. 
 
Key words: Self, other, objective measures, computational psychiatry, self network 
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Self as object  
What is the nature of the self? This question has been central to a wide range of 
disciplines for centuries. In the early days of scientific psychology, William James  
proposed (1890) the existence of different aspects of the self – the ‘Me’ and the ‘I’ [1]. 
The former can be considered as ‘self as object’, whereas the latter refers to ‘being an 
agent’. The ‘Me’ self is further composed of a physical, a social and a spiritual self [1] 
and the ‘I’ refers to being an agent. Sigmund Freud (1947) conceived of the self in terms 
of the ego, mediating between basic drives (the id) and social context/conscience (the 
superego) [2]. Although these early theories argued for the psychological reality of the 
self, researchers have more recently proposed that, similar to the concept of center of 
gravity [3], the concept of the self provides an explanatory narrative without serving as a 
mechanism that generates the narrative [4]. Following these arguments, much of the 
psycho-philosophical work has relied on subjective judgments and conscious evaluations 
of the self, what has been termed the ‘self as subject’ [5]. In this line of research, classic 
studies have used self-report measures to evaluate what people think and how they feel 
about themselves [6, 7]. Though useful, such methods are open to distortion through the 
demand characteristics of the social context and inferences made by participants about 
how to best present themselves. More recently, however, researchers have attempted to 
evaluate self processing by studying how associating stimuli to ourselves alters 
information processing (e.g. [8]). These studies focus on what we term the ‘self as object’ 
in mind and brain [9] and reveal several novel properties of self processing, including its 
ability to integrate perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes [5]. Here, it is worth 
distinguishing two definitions: self-related processing and self-referential processing [5, 
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10]. Christoff and colleagues argue that the self-experience of being an agent arises from 
self-specifying processing, and that both experiencing oneself as the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ 
reflect self-related processing [10]. In contrast, Northoff argues that these aspects of self 
reflect self-referential processing rather than self-related processing, and that the latter 
refers to processing of any stimulus in relation to the brain [5]. 
 
 We will distinguish between what we will term the ‘self as object’ [5] and ‘self as 
subject’ [1]; an important distinction between the two in this paper is that the former can 
be empirically operationalized through empirical manipulation and link to specific 
functional or neural processes (including both the ‘Me’ and ‘I’), and thus could be used 
as a probe for psychopathology and as a model of how we make inferences about 
ourselves. By synthesizing these new findings from psychology, neuroscience, and 
neuroeconomics, and the emerging field of computational psychiatry[11] (see 
Glossary), the aim of this paper is to put forward a new framework for quantifying and 
objectifying the self in the context of mental function and dysfunction. We then discuss 
the neural circuits involved in self processing and propose a neural model of the self as an 
emerging property of the interactions between three brain networks: a core ‘self network’ 
centered in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a cognitive control network consisting 
of the dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and a 
salience/affective network involving the insula and amygdala. This neural framework has 
broad applications in neuropsychological and psychiatric disorders characterized by 
alternations in self processing. 
 5 
 
New paradigms for measuring the self  
In this section, we review new paradigms related to self processing from experimental 
psychology, neuroeconomics, embodied cognition, and social neuroscience, and argue 
that this work can provide a new quantitative approach to understanding the self in 
mental function and dysfunction.  
 
Self in experimental psychology: perceptual matching.  
The past ten years or so has seen a burgeoning experimental psychology literature in 
which researchers have investigated how referring a stimulus to the self alters 
information processing, such as perception, attention, memory, visual awareness and 
decision making [12-16]. Notably, there is evidence that self-reference acts as a form of 
‘integrative glue’ which can either enhance or disrupt performance, depending on the task 
context, a process often referred to as integrative self [17]. For example, in face 
perception tasks where subjects are asked to classify faces as self, friend, or stranger, 
classification of self faces is faster than that of the faces of other people due to enhanced 
feature processing and the integration of facial features into configurations [18]. 
Furthermore, self-reference can also bind different stages of information processing [19-
21]. For example, one event-related potential (ERP) study examined the effects of facial 
cues on the orienting of visual attention. There was both an enhanced attention-related 
component N1 and a reduced decision making component P3 for self relative to others’ 
faces [21]. This suggests that heightened attention to the self is coupled with reduced 
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uncertainty in decision making, which may then enhance binding between different 
stages of processing.  
These effects on face processing are supported by findings from perceptual matching 
tasks (Fig. 1A) using neutral geometric shapes [16, 20]. In a typical experiment, 
participants associate a personal label (e.g., stranger, friend, you) to a neutral shape (e.g. 
triangle, circle, square) [16] and they immediately favor the shape associated with 
themselves compared to other shapes (Fig. 1B).  This effect suggests that perceptual 
judgments are enhanced by tagging external stimuli with internal self concept (i.e., 
referred by the personal label). Furthermore, this behavioral effect is subserved by 
enhanced connectivity between the mPFC (associated with self representations) and the 
pSTS (reflecting attention to external stimuli) [19, 20] (Fig. 1C and 1D) [20]. Northoff 
(2016) has argued that one of the key functions of the mPFC is to reflect representations 
of ourselves [22]. The pSTS is associated with sensory integration and self/other 
processing [22, 23]. Neuropsychological data additionally show that the breakdown of 
the vmPFC and the insula leads to the loss of self-biased responses in perceptual 
matching [24].  
============ Fig. 1 approximately here ============ 
This paradigm has been subsequently used to assess whether self-reference affects 
perceptual integration between stimuli. After forming associations between one personal 
label and two shapes, participants were asked to identify single or pairs of shapes as 
referring to the self or to a friend in a categorization task [8]. When the shapes referred to 
the self, there was a large benefit from presenting two, compared to one exemplar; that is, 
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there was a highly significant redundancy gain. Mathematical modeling showed that this 
redundancy gain was greater than what could be expected if there was independent 
processing of each self-shape exemplar [8]. Such benefit was not apparent for stimuli 
associated to a friend or to a monetary reward [25]. These results suggest that self-
reference enhances integration between self-related stimuli. Perceptual matching tasks 
have also been used to compare the role of reward [25] and emotion [26] in relation to the 
self, where participants associate a geometric shape with a particular reward value or a 
particular emotion. In addition, the perceptual matching paradigm benefits from other 
advantages including its test-retest reliability [27] and simplicity [28], making it easy to 
administer in special populations such as children, older adults and clinical patients [24, 
29, 30].    
 
Self in neuroeconomics: self- and other- related values and choices.  
A burgeoning literature has examined self- and other-related valuation and choices using 
tasks adapted from experimental economics in combination with neuroimaging, a field 
called neuroeconomics. One typical paradigm is the trust game (Fig. 2A) [31]. In this 
task, the ‘investor’ sends some money x to the ‘trustee’. This amount is tripled to 3x (i.e. 
simulating profits) before it reaches the ‘trustee’. The trustee then repays the investor an 
amount y (y ∈ [0,3x]) and this process is repeated. Unlike the perceptual matching 
paradigm, the trust game paradigm offers a clear temporally explicit dissociation between 
self vs. other processing due to its sequential nature (Fig. 2B). 
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Neuroimaging techniques have revealed the brain networks supporting the self- and 
other-related processing observed in the trust game. In healthy controls, the middle 
cingulate cortex is activated when participants make investment decisions as the 
‘investor’ (‘self phase’); and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is active when 
participants play the ‘trustee’ role and observe the investor’s decisions (‘other phase’) 
[32]. In addition, insula activity correlates with both the amount of investment when 
healthy controls play the ‘investor’ and the amount of offers when they play the ‘trustee’ 
[32]. In sharp contrast, patients with borderline personality disorder who played the 
‘investor’ role displayed flat insula activity in response to offers received from the 
partner during the ‘other’ phase, yet comparable levels of insula activity when they are 
making an investment decision during the ‘self’ phase (Fig. 2C; [33]). Another study 
showed that participants with autism displayed diminished cingulate activity during the 
self-decision phase, but preserved normal levels of cingulate responses when processing 
others’ decisions and when they play the ‘trustee’ in the trust game (Fig. 2D; [34]).   
 
Other studies have used the tasks that involve making decisions for oneself and another 
person. Results from these studies suggest that midline structures such as the mPFC 
encode value signals [35] and choices [36] related to both the self and others. When one’s 
own choices deviate from others’ choices, the insula is commonly activated [37]. Agency 
also directly affects motivated behaviors even when making choices for oneself. For 
example, intrinsic motivation activates the anterior insula to a greater extent than 
extrinsically motivated behavior [38]. Additionally, choice agency (i.e. having control of 
choices) is considered valuable itself. People prefer having a choice, than not having a 
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choice, and show increased activity in the ventral striatum when given a choice [39, 40]. 
Agency also promotes persistence when confronted with setbacks; a process modulated 
by ventral striatum and vmPFC [41]. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
neuroeconomic paradigms offer a unique opportunity for computational modeling of self- 
and other-processing, as well as quantifying self-related deficits in psychopathology; 
value signals (e.g. processed in striatum) also contributes a source of self-related 
information. 
 
============ Fig. 2 approximately here ============ 
Self in embodied and interoceptive paradigms.  
The importance of bodily signals in selfhood has also been extensively studied in recent 
studies. This line of research emphasizes that sensory (e.g. proprioceptive) and 
physiological (e.g. heart rate) signals coming from the body are crucial for the conscious 
awareness of feelings and ‘self as object’ [42-46]. One classical paradigm in this field is 
the rubber hand illusion in which one can acquire a false ownership of a rubber hand 
under multisensory (e.g. visuotactile) conflicts [47]. Based on this paradigm, 
Lenggenhager and colleagues developed a virtual reality paradigm to probe an out-of-
body experience [48] in which participants can acquire the false ownership of a virtual 
fake body when their own bodies and the fake body are stroked simultaneously [48]. The 
behavioral index of these bodily illusions is usually the ‘perceptual drift’ – the distance 
from the subjects’ own hand/body to the perceived hand/body. Neurally, sensorimotor 
areas and the insula have been commonly implicated (see[49] for a review). These studies 
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suggest that the sense of the self largely depends on the spatial boundaries of the body; by 
experimentally manipulating bodily information, the perception of the self can also be 
altered.  
 
A closely related line of work focuses on interoception, or the physiological conditions of 
the body. A commonly used heartbeat detection paradigm, for example, asks the subjects 
to either judge the timing of [50] or simply pay attention to their heartbeats [51, 52]. 
Interoceptive awareness measured in these studies also correlated with emotional 
awareness [50-53]. Neurally, interoception is implemented in a set of brain regions 
including the thalamus, brainstem, hypothalamus, amygdala, insula, cingulate, and 
somatomotor areas [50-52]. Computationally, the awareness of one’s own emotions and 
feelings can be realized through interoceptive inference, the approximate Bayesian 
inference about internal bodily states [44, 54]. Altered interoceptive inference may serve 
as a mechanism for disordered self processing and emotion in neuropsychiatric 
populations (e.g. [55]). Taken together, these results support the notion of an ‘embodied 
self’, consistent with the ‘material me’ idea proposed by William James [1, 56] as well as 
the notion of embodied cognition [44, 45].  
 
Self in social neuroscience: appraisal, theory of mind, and empathy.  
People often form beliefs about themselves through the lens of others and interactions 
with others. Thus, self processing has also been extensively examined in the growing 
field of social neuroscience. Many of these studies have examined the neural correlates 
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of self and other representation using cognitive appraisal tasks, such as self-referential 
tasks [57]. In these tasks, participants are typically asked to make judgments about 
themselves and another person (e.g. “Am I / Is he brave?”). Consistent with findings from 
other self paradigms, these tasks commonly engage the mPFC, with a ventral-to-dorsal 
gradient for self- to other-related processing [57]. These tasks have also provided 
important insights into altered self processing in psychiatric disorders such as post-
traumatic stress disorder [58], anorexia nervosa [59], and borderline personality disorder 
[60].  
 
Previous work has also investigated the self in the context of theory of mind (ToM), the 
ability to infer others’ thoughts and beliefs [61]. ToM is closely related to perspective 
taking (e.g. measured by the ‘Sally-Ann test’ [62]). It has been suggested that both self 
and other perspectives activate the mPFC and superior temporal gyrus [63]. Thus, it is not 
surprising that impairments in one’s own awareness (e.g. as seen in alexithymia) are 
associated with impaired mentalizing and perspective-taking, as well as reduced 
activation in the mPFC [64]. Similarly, in conditions involving social cognitive 
impairments (e.g. autism), there is usually disturbed self processing [65, 66].  
 
Lastly, existing studies have demonstrated that the representation of self-emotions is 
crucial for empathy, the representation of others’ emotional states. Wicker and 
colleagues, for example, were amongst the first to observe common neural activation in 
the insula associated with feeling disgust oneself and observing others’ disgust [67]. This 
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finding has since inspired many studies to examine shared neural representations for self- 
and empathetic emotions including pain, positive or negative emotions [68, 69]. These 
studies demonstrate that an insula–ACC network shows the most consistent activation in 
both the perception of one’s own pain and the perception of others’ pain [43, 70]. As an 
important region for emotion encoding, the amygdala also responds to both self and other 
emotions, as revealed by recent meta-analyses [43, 70]. In addition, the mPFC is 
activated by the conscious evaluation of self and other emotions [69]. Importantly, the 
disruption in processing self emotions has been directly linked to deficits in perceiving 
others’ emotions in people with autism [55, 71]. These data collectively support a critical 
role of self processing in normal social and affective functions. While the dependency 
between self and other representations remains to be further investigated, these results 
clearly indicate a strong link between self and other perception in both cognitive and 
affective domains, and also provide quantitative paradigms for measuring the self through 
the reflection of others. 
 
It is noteworthy that in addition to these new paradigms, emerging analytic techniques 
applied to ‘old’ methods have also yielded fruitful results. For instance, Lutz and 
colleagues divided participants’ first-person reports into ‘phenomenological clusters’, and 
found that different, yet stable neurophysiological (EEG) signatures emerged for different 
phenomenological clusters [72]. Furthermore, techniques such as the Explicitation 
Interview (a guided retrospective introspection) and Descriptive Experience Sampling (in 
which subjects carry a beeper around and document their inner thoughts whenever the 
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beeper beeps) also offer new insights into our inner experiences through structured 
interviews and examinations [73]. 
 
Neural model of the self as object  
Based on the literature reviewed above, we propose a neural framework of the ‘self as 
object’, which considers the self as an emerging property of interactions between brain 
networks implementing the ‘core self’, cognitive control, and salience processing (Fig. 3) 
[28]. These interactions across the networks reflect the relations between the strengths of 
cognitive representation and emotional response related to the self.  
 
============ Insert Fig. 3 ============ 
 
This neural model is built on the integrative property of the self. At the behavioral level, 
self-reference serves a binding function to facilitate various stages of information 
processing [15, 17, 27]. Neurally, the integrative property of the self is associated with 
the function of the vmPFC extending to the ACC [74], and how these areas couple with 
other brain regions [75]. There is a gradient of self-related processing in the ventral-
dorsal axis along the mPFC [57] - while activity in the vmPFC is consistently associated 
with internal self processing, the dorsal mPFC (dmPFC) is more engaged in other-related 
judgments [57]  .  
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fMRI studies of self-processing have consistently demonstrated increased coupling 
between the vmPFC and brain regions important for cognitive control such as the pSTS 
and dlPFC [20]. The pSTS is thought to be critical for sensory integration and stimulus-
driven social attention [76]. Researchers have reported increased functional coupling 
between vmPFC and pSTS during self processing [20], which contributes to a form of 
‘social saliency’ in the presence of self-related stimuli. It has been also shown that the 
vmPFC and dlPFC have opposite response patterns in the presence of self-related stimuli: 
vmPFC shows increased activity, while dlPFC has decreased activity [20, 77]. In 
addition, dlPFC is more active when participants respond to stimuli associated with other 
people [20]. These contrasting effects support a processing network in which self-related 
neural circuits (e.g., vmPFC) interact with brain regions concerned with bottom-up (e.g. 
pSTS) and top-down cognitive control (e.g. dlPFC) (Fig. 3) [77]. When self-related 
information is irrelevant to the task, the activities of these regions may be set in 
opposition so that cognitive control regions must suppress self-related attention. 
Consistent with this, lesions affecting top-down attentional regions (e.g. dlPFC) can 
result in enhanced self-biases due to the release of attentional control [24, 78].  
 
Interactions between the mPFC and the salience network have also been reported. 
Anatomically, there are rich connections between the insula, amygdala, striatum, and the 
mPFC [79, 80]. During rest, functional activity of the vmPFC and 
insula/amygdala/striatum, are anticorrelated – the former is considered as part of the 
‘default mode network’ while the latter is considered part of the ‘salience network’ [81]. 
Lesion studies have shown that brain damage to both the vmPFC and the insula is 
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associated with reduced self-biases in perception and memory [24]. Disrupted insula-
amygdala-mPFC connectivity has been often observed in psychiatric disorders [82]. It 
remains to be further investigated, using effective connectivity modeling (e.g. dynamic 
causal modeling [83]), how these regions causally interact during self processing. 
This neural model of the self as object has broad potential implications for understanding 
a wide range of neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric disorders related to self-
processing, that can be characterized by the extent of shifts away from a normative mean 
with the networks - the mPFC, dlPFC, pSTS, striatum, and sulcus (Fig. 3).  
  
Concluding Remarks 
We have proposed that by adopting the ‘self as object’ framework, it is possible to 
provide quantitative measures to characterize the self using emerging paradigms such as 
perceptual matching, the trust game, embodied self, and social neuroscience paradigms. 
This emerging objective measure of self biases that can be used as a proxy for self-
representation is supported by a proposed neural framework which hypothesizes 
interactions between brain networks responding to the core self, cognitive control, and 
salience. There are many remaining issues to be addressed (see Outstanding Questions). 
For instance, what algorithm does the brain use to ‘compute’ the self? What are the 
causal interactions between the proposed neural regions? What neurotransmitters are 
involved in self processing? To the best of our knowledge, none of these questions has 
been formally addressed in the self literature. Importantly, it would be valuable to 
consider the self as a dimensional measure and apply the ‘self as object’ framework to 
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different clinical populations, as proposed by the Research Domain Criteria framework of 
the National Institute of Mental Health in the U.S. (Box 1). For example, bias in self-
focused attention and affect is evident in several clinical populations such as depressed 
individuals. Thus, the paradigms and models reviewed here could potentially provide 
valuable insights into the mechanisms of mental illness. 
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Glossary 
Alexithymia: A condition marked by impaired awareness of self emotions. 
Bayesian inference: A statistical inference method in which Bayes’ theorem is used to 
update the probability for a hypothesis as one accumulates more evidence or information. 
Computational psychiatry: An emerging interdisciplinary field that seeks to 
characterize mental disorders in terms of aberrant computations at multiple scales. 
Embodied cognition (embodiment): A theory that suggests that mental processes are 
shaped by aspects of the body. 
Empathy: The understanding of other people’s emotional states. 
Empirical manipulation: A scientific method that involves the systematic control and 
change of experimental conditions in laboratory settings. 
Event-related potential (ERP): Electrical activities of the brain due to a specific 
sensory, cognitive, or motor event, measured by eletroencephalography (EEG). 
Interoception: The sense of the physiological states of the body. It is considered to be 
processed in a specific neural pathway that includes the thalamus, hypothalamus, insula, 
amygdala, and several other regions. 
Interoceptive inference: the approximate Bayesian inference about internal bodily 
states. 
Integrative self: A mechanistic function of self where self-reference enhances the 
binding of information and psychological processes through neural couplings between the 
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vmPFC and other brain regions. It can be used to interpret a wide range of optimal 
behaviors. 
Interoceptive inference: The approximate Bayesian inference about internal bodily 
states. 
Neuroeconomics: An interdisciplinary field that aims to understand the neural basis of 
economic decision-making, and how economic behavior can shape the brain. 
Out-of-body experience: The sensation of separation from one’s own body and seeing 
one’s own body from a distance. 
Rubber hand illusion: A visuotactile illusion in which the participant feels ownership of 
a fake rubber hand placed in front of her after watching the fake hand and her own hand 
being stroked at the same time. 
Social neuroscience: An interdisciplinary field that seeks to investigate the neural basis 
of social processes. 
Theory of Mind: The ability to infer and understand another person’s thoughts, beliefs, 
and goals. 
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Box 1. Self, Psychopathology, and the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) era 
 
RDoC is a recent initiative started by the NIMH, aiming to re-define the research 
framework for studying mental functions and dysfunctions [84]. The RDoC matrix 
integrates multiple levels of analyses (e.g. genetics, neural circuits) with functional 
domains (e.g. cognitive processes, social processes).  Currently, there are five domains in 
RDoC: Negative Valence Systems, Positive Valence Systems, Cognitive Systems, Social 
Processes, and Arousal and Regulatory Systems. Importantly, perception and 
understanding of the self is listed as one of the four constructs under Social Processes 
(together with perception and understanding of others, social communication, and 
affiliation and attachment). Compared to many other construals in RDoC, reliable and 
objective instruments to measure the self in neuropsychiatric research are currently 
lacking, especially given the progress of studies on the self in psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience; and most measures of self processing in psychiatry have mainly depended 
on conventional qualitative self-report questionnaires [85].  
 
To showcase the importance of quantifying the self with objective measures, we will focus 
on one example from the clinical realm: major depressive disorder (MDD). Quantitative 
paradigms have pointed at two self-related changes in depression. First, depressed patients 
usually show excessive self-focused attention [86]. It has been suggested that such a self-
bias could divert one’s attention from external stimuli, and is also highly related to 
rumination in depression [86]. Neurally, depressed patients show excessive mPFC 
activation but decreased dlPFC activation when making judgments about themselves in 
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self-referential tasks, providing a neural substrate for enhanced self-focused attention in 
these patients [86]. Second, studies using valence-based tasks typically suggest that for 
negative stimuli, MDD patients display decreased activation in dlPFC, yet hyper-activation 
in the amygdala and insula. For positive stimuli, however, patients show decreased insula 
and striatum activations but increased vmPFC activation, compared to controls [87]. These 
findings fit nicely with the anhedonia model of MDD [88], which considers MDD as a 
condition of reduced response to rewards (usually accompanied by reduced striatum 
activity). Taken together, these data confirm that MDD is marked by self-biased attention, 
and altered valence processing related to the self. 
 
Although decreased or increased neural activations do not always directly correspond to 
reduced or enhanced behavioral sensitivity [20], we propose that tasks that can objectively 
measure the ‘self as object’ may be sensitive to clinical changes found in disorders such as 
MDD, and that classification using these objective measures of self prioritization may 
provide a way of moving diagnosis away from subjective evaluation. Studying self 
processing is also highly important for evaluating treatment outcomes. For example, 
antidepressant treatment can largely normalize disturbed neural responses to emotion (e.g. 
amygdala) in depressed patients [89, 90]. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is another 
mainstream treatment option, and one core component of CBT is the modification of 
maladaptive beliefs about the self [91]. Within the self attention framework [77], this 
modification (e.g. for MDD) can be conceptualized in terms of increased activation of the 
dorsal attention network compensating for decreased activation of the self-attentional 
network.  
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Measuring the self using a perceptual matching task. A) Participants are 
instructed to associate three geometric shapes with three people, and then complete a 
shape-label matching task where shape-label pairs are presented as in their original 
assignment or not. B) The typical results are more accurate and faster responses to the 
self-associated shape compared to other-associated shapes, phenomena referred to as a 
self-prioritization effect. C) Self prioritization is supported by a specific neural circuit 
between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and left posterior superior temporal 
sulcus (pSTS). By contrast, matching stranger- compared to self-associated shapes 
recruits an executive control network.  D) The ventral self network and the executive 
control network play opposite roles in self and other processing (Panels B-C-D are 
modified from [20]). 
 
Figure 2. Measuring the self using a neuroeconomic paradigm: the trust game. A) In 
this version of the trust game, player one, the ‘investor’, sends a certain amount of money 
x out of an initial endowment of 20 monetary units (MU), to player two, the ‘trustee’. 
This amount is tripled to 3x before it reaches the trustee. The trustee then repays the 
investor an amount y (y ∈ [0,3x]) and the process is repeated.  B) In a typical session, the 
participant plays the role of either the investor (upper panel) or the trustee (lower panel).  
The ‘self’ vs. ‘other’ phases would thus be of opposite order for the two conditions. C) 
Subjects with borderline personality disorder (BPD) show reduced neural response in the 
‘other’ phase but not in the ‘self’ phase when they played the role of investor (modified 
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from [33]). D) Subjects with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) show diminished ‘self’ 
response but spared ‘other’ response when playing the role of trustee (modified from 
[34]). The bars in panels C-D are schematic, and do not quantitatively reflect actual data. 
 
Figure 3. A neural model of the self as object. Self is implemented through a ‘core self’ 
network (e.g. mPFC), a cognitive control network (e.g. dlPFC, pSTS), and 
salience/affective network (e.g. insula, amygdala, striatum). The mPFC (extending into 
ACC) is considered to mediate internally-focused mental processing, which is usually 
inhibited in order to maintain attention on an on-going task [77]. There is a gradient of 
self-related processing in the ventral-dorsal axis along the mPFC [57] – the vmPFC is 
consistently associated with internal self processing whereas the dmPFC is more engaged 
in other-related judgments [57].  The dlPFC and pSTS are considered to process attention 
and cognitive control related to external stimuli. The insula, striatum, and amygdala are 
involved in the processing of salient emotional and reward stimuli. ACC: anterior 
cingulate cortex; pSTS: posterior superior temporal sulcus; dmPFC, vmPFC and dlPFC: 
dorso-medial, ventro-medial and dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex, respectively.   
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